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ABSTRACT 
The title of my research report, Liberty and the Infosphere: Affiliation over Citizenship, speaks about 
an ideal of liberty, a maximal version, and then asks where such a version may be located, the 
proposition being that the infosphere, or more specifically, the internet offers such an environment. It 
then poses a supporting proposition in the form of the question: why we ought to a pursue a libertarian 
quest for freedom of affiliation online. This implies that we should affiliate with others, and that 
affiliation, as a collective-forming enterprise, is a better way of expressing liberty than that offered by 
the concept of citizenship. In pursuing this line of thought, I draw on a consequentialist frame of 
reference, arguing that liberty ought to guide us towards achieving the best results for both ourselves as 
well as others. This leads me further to propose a rule-consequentialist formulation of principles 
designed to maximise our experience of liberty by steering us through morally permissible actions and 
away from morally impermissible alternatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
John Stuart Mill, writing in the mid-1800’s, was deeply concerned about liberty – morally, socially, and 
politically. He was especially concerned about the tyranny of mass opinion and its attendant prejudices. 
Today, over a century and a half later, these concerns are still prevalent. 
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In Liberty and the Infosphere: Affiliation over Citizenship, I consider the extent to which liberty may 
be maximised online in the internet, a sub-section of what Luciano Floridi calls the Infosphere. The 
orientation of liberty online is prompted by dilemmas occurring offline. These include the censure, 
oftentimes extreme, of individuals and/or sub-groups within a society or a nation-state. Online though, 
people can project themselves beyond the physical limitations of the state. And so, I argue that online 
the collective-forming initiative of voluntary affiliation affords individuals (and, by extension, 
collectives) a greater sense of liberty than that available to them offline through the institution of their 
citizenship. 
 
Given the limitations and complications of offline liberty, principally of nation-state citizenship, and 
the virtual borderless-ness and complexities of an online alternative, what are the appropriate normative 
strategies and applied procedures for furthering liberty online?  
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RATIONALE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE REPORT 
Article 3 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims liberty as an inviolable human right. 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf) However, the journalistic 
excerpts below belie the overriding authority of such a claim. In the first, a secular blogger, living and 
working in a secular country, is targeted and killed by religious extremists; in the second, those who 
identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersexed (LGBTI) are subject in at least seventy-six 
countries to punitive laws that criminalise their sexual orientation. 
 
On the issue of censure, in the form of extreme retribution, “The Guardian” website ran an article on 
May 12, 2015, by Saad Hammadi and Agence France-Presse, entitled, Third atheist blogger killed in 
Bangladesh knife attack. 
  
“A secular blogger [Ananta Bijoy Das] has been hacked to death in north-
east Bangladesh, the third such deadly attack this year… Imran Sarker, head of a 
Bangladeshi bloggers’ association, said Das was an atheist who wrote blogs for 
Mukto-Mona, a website formerly moderated by Avijit Roy, a Bangladeshi-born US 
citizen who was stabbed to death in the capital, Dhaka, in February... According to 
the Mukto-Mona site, Das won the publication’s annual rationalist award in 2006 
for his “deep and courageous interest in spreading secular and humanist ideals and 
messages” ... Bangladesh is an officially secular country… There has been an 
increase in attacks by religious extremists in recent years.” 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/12/third-atheist-blogger-killed-in-
bangladesh-after-knife-attack) 
 
On the issue of censure, in the form of legal repression, the website “Erasing 76 Crimes”, lists 76 
countries where LGBTI is currently illegal: 
 
“A total of 72 countries have criminal laws against sexual activity by lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender or intersex (LGBTI) people, according to a tally by 
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the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, or ILGA. 
In a similar tally by the Erasing 76 Crimes blog, a total of 76 countries have such 
laws. The discrepancy is a matter of categorization, not a disagreement about where 
such repressive laws apply.” 
(https://76crimes.com/76-countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal/) 
 
Liberty for some does not include liberty for all. While rights exist to safeguard liberty, in practice these 
are often violated, either in a sense, culturally, as with religious retribution (article 1) or, juristically, in 
the case of legal repression (article 2). The questions foremost in my mind are: how is liberty to be 
understood and expressed; who has the right to pursue liberty and where; which versions of liberty, if 
any, count for more than others; are there acceptable limitations on the liberty of some because of a 
priority that may be afforded the liberty of the many? Assuming consensus cannot be reached on what 
qualifies as liberty, but that consensus exists around the fact of there being differences of opinion on 
multiple issues of moral interest, how and where ought the complexities of this ethical pluralism to be 
addressed? In other words, is there a viable normative means of maximising liberty, and, if so, where 
would such a version of liberty ideally be located? Firstly, I shall contend that there is a viable normative 
means of maximising liberty and, secondly, I shall propose that such a version may ideally thrive online. 
 
RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this report is to suggest a normative means of maximising liberty online. 
In seeking to fulfil this aim, I will address the following: 
1. What does liberty entail and how may it be maximised? 
2. What distinguishes an online version of liberty from an offline version of liberty? 
3. Is an online version of liberty a maximising version compared to an offline version of liberty? 
4. What are the appropriate normative strategies and applied procedures for maximising liberty 
online?  
The following are the main objectives of this report: 
1. To describe the main features of liberty; 
2. In light of 1., to posit a maximising version of these features; 
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3. In light of 2., to suggest a means of exemplifying these features, individually as well as 
collectively; 
4. To contrast and compare the expression of liberty online versus offline; 
5. To posit a normative means of maximising liberty online.   
 
Furthermore, while each of the themes in this report has been extensively addressed in the literature, 
they have not, on my investigation, been combined in the way I propose doing here. It is therefore my 
hope to add to the literature, not by necessarily augmenting the theories related to each of the themes, 
but by synthesising them in such a way as to shed at least some light on the means by which liberty 
may be maximised online. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Within the overarching theme of Liberty and The Infosphere: Affiliation Over Citizenship, my report 
includes the proposition of why we ought to pursue a libertarian quest for freedom of affiliation online. 
In their account of libertarianism, also referred to as classical liberalism, Peter Vallentyne and Bas van 
der Vossen assert that “libertarianism is a [mainly] political philosophy that affirms the rights of 
individuals to liberty, to acquire, keep, and exchange their holdings [or property], and considers the 
protection of individual rights the primary role for the [minimal] state.” (Vallentyne and van der Vossen, 
2014: p.1) From this, a narrower version of moral libertarianism is primarily concerned with the matter 
of self-ownership, which, in its strongest sense, prohibits the non-consensual use of one’s person by 
others (Ibid, 2014: p.4). Altogether, the quest being proposed is that of pursuing a social project of 
mutually beneficial interests by recognising the intrinsic value of the individual, expressing her liberty 
as an individual, with like regard for the liberty of others. 
 
Gerald Gaus and Shane G. Courtland observe that “running throughout liberal political theory is an 
ideal of a free person as one whose actions are in some sense her own.” (Gaus and Courtland, 2015: 
p.5) Nonetheless, on a point of contrast between classical liberalism and ‘new’ liberalism, which is 
more egalitarian in nature, Gaus and Courtland note that “since the aim of government in a community 
is to assure the basic liberty and property rights of its citizens, borders are not of great moral significance 
in classical liberalism. In contrast under the ‘new’ liberalism, which stresses redistributive programs to 
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achieve social justice, it matters a great deal who is included within the political or moral community.” 
(Ibid, 2015: p.21) Given my aim of maximising liberty online, the libertarian notion of the moral 
insignificance of borders is instructive. 
 
I shall also apply a version of rule-consequentialism with which to maximise the pursuit of liberty based 
on good outcomes. Adopting Mill’s harm principle as the primary rule, I will then apply the rules of 
online privacy and unrestricted online access, as in freedom of association. These are intended to 
preserve the integrity of individuals and foster affiliation within collectives respectively. Under the 
auspices of Mill’s harm principle, both privacy and unrestricted access shall be applied in such a way 
as to avoid the type of impermissible harm that would otherwise violate the intended good outcomes of 
a general consequentialist aim. 
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STRUCURE OF THE ARGUMENT AND THE REPORT 
My argument is summed up in the following diagrams and accompanying explanation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, liberty concerns self-interest and, morally and politically, the interests of others. A 
central claim I will make is that liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression 
of individual and, by extension, collective purpose, which is then explored online. 
 
• One’s autonomy pertains to oneself personally (aligning with a libertarian sense of self-
ownership) and to others morally. 
• Positively, purpose entails the will and ability to act and, negatively, the absence of 
impediments to this action. 
• Individuals subscribe to an identity, which I will argue can be prolifically (and virtually) 
comprised of multiple interests. 
• Collectives are ideally formed from the voluntary initiative of their members. 
• Individuals, expressing themselves prolifically, through voluntary affiliations with others can 
do so most readily online. 
Figure 1 Overview of argument 
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Consequentialism
Rule
Equal
Intended
• To preserve the integrity of their liberty, the rules of privacy and unrestricted access ought to 
be observed. 
• These, in subordination to Mill’s harm principle, establish an overarching rule-consequentialist 
criteria according to which liberty acts as a prescript, guiding us towards morally permissible 
consequences by steering us away from morally impermissible alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• This consequentialist approach also includes equal consideration of all persons’ value and aims 
to yield the subjective outcomes of intended or foreseen consequences. 
• The entire response calls into question our conception of citizenship as it applies to the 
organisation of moral norms of liberty among shifting global societies.  
Figure 2 A rule-consequentialist approach 
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1. LIBERTY 
1.1. LIBERTY 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An exposition of liberty, drawn from the work of John Stuart Mill; 
• A definition of the particular version of harm and the harm principle I intend applying within a 
rule-consequentialist framework; 
• An exposition of libertarianism, politically and morally, and my reasons for applying it to my 
argument; 
• An explanation of the rule-consequentialist approach I shall apply as a permissive normative 
strategy of maximising liberty online. 
 
ON LIBERTY 
As stated in my introduction, Mill is especially concerned about the tyranny of mass opinion and its 
attendant prejudices. For example, a community that includes a minority denied their liberty cannot 
derive a higher sense of liberty except on the basis of prejudice – exactly the concern Mill seeks to 
resolve. As such, Mill establishes the individual as the primary agent of liberty. Only following moral 
consideration of the individual first can the collective interest be developed further. But what exactly 
does ‘the individual interest’ entail? How would Mill, or anyone for that matter, provide a definition 
comprehensive enough to include every conceivable, or, should that be, every permissible interest? No 
plausible answer exists for such a question. The range of interests is too vast. Furthermore, the reality 
of ethical pluralism renders any attempt at establishing a definitive list of permissible interests 
inadequate. Hence, Mill goes on to endorse an “antagonism of opinions,’” (Ryan, 2006: p.xxvii) initially 
proffered by Alexis de Tocqueville, in virtue of a thriving liberty of competing opinions in which “no 
single view dominated.” (Ibid: p.xxvii) The value of this derives from the reflexive nature of engaging 
with one another on equal terms: one’s self-interests enhanced by an appreciation of, but also a 
contention with the interests of others. Also, the possibility that a contrarian opinion may on merit turn 
out to be true, or, if false, aid in fortifying the merit of an alternative, is further reason not to censor it. 
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In addition to de Tocqueville’s antagonism of opinions, Mill endorses a) the interaction of individuals 
and collectives; b) pursuing what they believe is in their own best interest; by c) expressing a self-
expansive style of liberty, including freedom of expression and association. In the words of Alan Ryan, 
“[w]e need freedom of speech and thought not just to discover new truths about external reality, but 
also to discover new truths about what we might do with our lives. Because human beings and human 
nature itself change over time, we must keep the door open for new insights.” (Ibid, 2006: p.xxxiii) 
Encouraging this progressive style of perpetual self-discovery with like regard for the same in others, 
Mill nonetheless introduces what he calls the harm principle with which to set prudential limits to our 
self- and other-regarding attitudes and behaviours. Simply put, “we may only coerce [as in constrain] 
those who inflict [direct] harm on other people who have not given their full and free consent, [that is, 
non-consenting innocents.]” (Ibid, 2006: p.xxxix) The rule here is one of self-defence. Importantly, 
according to Mill, it does not preside over other instances, even those involving self-harm. 
 
 
But what exactly does the harm principle entail? James Edwards notes that “there is no single such 
principle; there are many harm principles.” (Edwards, 2014: p.253) Of particular interest is Edwards’ 
observation that certain types of harm principles are criticised for being either under-inclusive or over-
inclusive (Ibid, 2014: p.254). In the case of the latter, liberty is likely to be unduly constrained due to 
over-regulation, whereas with the former the risks pertain to an attitude of imprudent over-
permissiveness liable to result in instances of otherwise avoidable harm. But what did Mill have in mind 
and is his version helpful? Edwards notes that “Mill’s harm principle… is most plausibly seen as a 
negative constraint.” Edwards goes on to explain: “The fact that my purpose in prohibiting [something] 
is to prevent harm cannot itself be thought to generate a reason to prohibit [that something].” (Ibid, 
2014: p.257) For example, I may be prevented from firing a gun if and only if in so doing my intent is 
to cause harm to an innocent, rather than practice my aim at a target. The act though of firing a gun is 
not in question. So then, practicing a certain belief (secularism, for example) or identifying with a 
particular sexual orientation (gay, for example) are both in and of themselves harmless. Similarly, 
opposing positions – religious fundamentalism over secularism – are mutually harmless. Edwards adds 
that “one is harmed by that which diminishes one’s prospects in life. One’s prospects in life are partly 
a function of one’s ability to pursue whatever valuable projects and goals one has set for oneself.” (Ibid, 
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2014: p.260) In other words, one’s life orientation (meant in the sense of one’s beliefs, practices and 
goals) ought not to be the target of direct harm, either in the form of undue constraint or extreme 
violation. The harm principle, negatively speaking, prohibits actions based on their impermissible 
consequences, defined as those acts which may foreseeably result in either diminishing someone’s life 
prospects or causing them unwanted harm. On my view, the feature of foreseeability is important 
because it imputes responsibility to the agent of action based on his/her appreciation of what may 
diminish another’s life prospects and/or cause them direct harm. 
 
In summary then, Mill’s version of liberty includes the following: 
§ It is impermissible to silence an opinion which may be true (Mill, 1859/2006: p.60); 
§ Diversity is a vital characteristic of a thriving environment open to multiple opinions (Ibid, 
1859/2006: p.53); 
§ Individuals ought to be free to choose what they know is in their best self-interest (Ibid, 
1859/2006: p.113); 
§ Self- and other-regarding considerations of liberty ought to be exercised freely without bringing 
harm to others or impeding their ability to achieve the same (Ibid, 1859/2006: p.16); 
§ The individual’s and, by extension, collective’s ultimate purpose is to give free reign to their 
pursuit of liberty and well-being. (Ibid, 1859/2006: p.60) 
 
 
I now turn my attention to the theory of libertarianism, which is politically and morally centred on the 
value of the individual. 
 
LIBERTARIANISM 
Politically speaking, libertarianism endorses individual liberty and ownership of property, secured and 
protected by a minimal state. Morally speaking, libertarianism promotes the concept of self-ownership 
free of any external non-consensual coercion. In their Introduction to “Alternative Conceptions of Civil 
Society”, Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka note that “[Michal] Walzer’s [left-liberal] egalitarian 
perspective leads him to defend a strongly positive theory of the state, while [Loren] Lomasky insists 
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on a minimal state. Walzer’s civil society is one in which the opportunities afforded by voluntary 
association are guaranteed by the state, whereas for Lomasky civil society thrives by default, that is, by 
the state withdrawing in favor (sic) of maximum liberty for individuals to “direct their affairs as they 
see fit.”” (Chambers and Kymlicka, 2002: p.8) 
  
In other words, libertarianism entails a permissive state of self-rule; it promotes a high degree of 
independence and as little external interference as possible. In the words of Robert Nozick, “Individuals 
are inviolable.” (Nozick, 1974/2013: p.31) Another key element of Nozick’s argument is that 
libertarianism recognises the uniqueness of the individual, whereas other liberal theories sublimate the 
individual into the broader context of collective well-being. (Mack, 2015: p.13) The combination of 
self-ownership and a protective yet non-interfering minimal state accords well with Mill’s emphasis on 
individual liberty free of the tyranny of mass prejudice. From this account, the appeal of voluntary 
affiliation seems more apparent from a view of individuals acting in their own self-interest, 
unencumbered by any form of unsolicited and/or collective coercion. Within this libertarian framework, 
I propose that the contribution to be drawn from the concept of property relates to the virtual article of 
oneself, occupying a place online in the internet. Therefore, the role of a ‘state’ is to recognise and 
protect the individual’s ownership of the virtual article of herself. (I am not including other online forms 
of property such as domains and so on.) This virtual article of identity can be comprised of multiple 
interests. (This will be the topic of further discussion in the section on identity below.) Suffice it to add 
at this juncture that an individual, an identity, comprised of multiple interests and multiple online 
personas, can interact simultaneously with other multiple online personas. The environment capable of 
accommodating this type of interaction, the state in a sense, is, I propose, a virtual borderless global 
state, the state of the internet. While it is possible for the internet to be limited, whereby certain sites 
and services are either blocked or censored, which is the case in some countries today, in general use 
the internet provides people with a far greater scope of movement and interaction than is ordinarily 
available to them in their physical lives. Therefore, if one’s online experience is important to one 
individually, then it is important to adopt a normative approach of acknowledging and protecting one’s 
sense of individuality online. Hence, libertarianism, politically (or, perhaps, a-politically in a sense) and 
morally, seems well-suited to furthering this intention. 
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Liberty, on Mill’s view and the view of libertarians, primarily concerns individual self-interest. Through 
a variety of other features, including diversity and the impermissibility of illegitimate harm, it extends 
to include the interests of others too. In other words, liberty ought to be constrained in instances where 
direct harm may be inflicted on innocents. Hence, even the most progressive style of liberty is not 
without limits. If maximising liberty depends upon a state of permissibility, that permissibility in turn 
depends upon the prudential, as in, foreseeable, anticipation of consequences that are likely to avoid the 
type of harm under discussion. Therefore, in an effort to realise the broadest expression of self- and 
other-regarding interests, a minimal cluster of rules ought to be set down with the intention of giving 
liberty as wide a berth as possible with as clear-sighted a view as possible of avoiding impermissible 
consequences. 
 
This brings me to a discussion of the application of a rule-consequentialist approach. 
 
RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM 
“[Consequentialism] assesses acts and/or character traits, practices, and institutions solely in terms of 
the goodness of the consequences.” (Hooker, 2016: p.2) Having adopted Mill’s harm principle as a 
negative constraint, moral consideration must vest with the anticipated intention of avoiding harm to 
innocents. Accordingly, something, a belief, practice or an act, is harmless in and of itself and it is its 
improper application that ought to be scrutinised in instances where it is likely or intended to bring 
unwanted harm to others. So as to legitimately limit such applications or intentions, rules ought to be 
established so as not to sanction the belief, practice or act, but to prevent the belief, practice or act being 
applied in such a way as to lead to foreseeable harm being exacted on innocents. This sharpens my 
application of consequentialism into rule-consequentialism. The rules ought to apply so as to produce 
the best foreseeable consequences by comparison to the consequences likely to ensue from alternative 
rules. The primary rule to be applied in the case of liberty is Mill’s harm principle. When it comes to 
maximising liberty online in the internet I will apply the additional rules of privacy and unrestricted 
access, both of which are addressed in more detail in the relevant sections below. Furthermore, “in 
determining moral rightness, benefits to one person matter just as much as similar benefits to any other 
person ([that is,] all who count count equally).” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015: p.4) On the view of each 
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person’s uniqueness, and a collective obligation to avoid the tyranny of mass prejudice, a 
consequentialism of equal consideration ought also to be applied. Assessing the normative implication 
of the harm principle from this perspective it is apparent that it applies impartially to all individuals. In 
other words, an equal-rule-consequentialist framework functions to secure the liberty of all impartially, 
equally and with as much foreseeable clarity as can be anticipated. The requirement of foreseeability is 
hence the third and final feature of my proposed consequentialist approach. It requires that when acting 
each person does so with as comprehensive a moral consideration as they are capable of applying. While 
such consideration may centre on their self-interest first, it cannot be said to be comprehensive if it 
stops short of considering the interests of others too. 
 
In summary, the proposed consequentialist approach includes the following: 
• A minimal set of rules with which to regulate as permissive an environment as possible for the 
purpose of maximising liberty; 
• Rules which apply impartially and with equal consideration of each person’s interests; 
• Rules designed to produce the best foreseeable consequences. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On Mill’s view and the view of libertarianism, liberty concerns self-interest and, morally and politically, 
the interests of others. Endorsing a diversity of opinions, and freedom of expression and association 
(which I will later refer to as voluntary affiliation), Mill seeks to promote a progressive style of liberty. 
Harm is that, on the view of Mill, which entails the negative constraint prohibiting acts which result in 
direct harm to innocents. Furthermore, libertarianism endorses as little external interference as possible 
in individual affairs, in other words, a minimal state. A minimal state combined with a minimal set of 
rules in a rule-consequentialist approach is, I propose, well-suited to maximising liberty. Locating 
liberty primarily in individuals, for whom liberty is intrinsically valuable to their well-being, it is 
important to understand how we ought to express liberty as comprehensively as we can. 
 
This brings me to the themes of autonomy and purpose. 
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1.2. AUTONOMY 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An exposition of autonomy, personal as well as moral, which includes the major conditions of 
a comprehensive version of autonomy; 
• A rationale for why a comprehensive version of autonomy is required if individuals are to 
maximise their expression of liberty. 
 
ON AUTONOMY 
From a personal perspective, autonomy “concerns the independence and authenticity of the… values 
[and] emotions that move one to act in the first place.” (Christman, 2015: p.10) From a moral 
perspective, autonomy concerns “the respect others owe to us (and we owe ourselves).” (Ibid, 2015: 
p.10) Both versions of autonomy, personal and moral, rely on our independence of deliberation. Hence, 
personal autonomy also includes, a) “authenticity conditions” – the ability to reflect upon and identify 
with one’s desires and values; and, b) “competency conditions” – the capacity for independent 
deliberation free of external interference of a debilitative or manipulative kind. (Ibid, 2015: pp.4-6) And 
moral autonomy requires, a) rational precedence – the recognition of one’s (and everyone else’s) 
inherent freedom, encouraging prudential formulations of moral obligation among rational agents; and, 
b) relational reasoning, whereby moral imperatives are patterned from an “enmeshed” arrangement of 
rational and passionate (psychological, emotional) considerations. (Christman referencing Sandel, 
2015: p.21) 
 
The underlying principle of impartiality that provides justification for rules (within a rule-
consequentialist framework) means that we ought to have sound reasons, based on foreseen 
consequences, for how we go about expressing liberty. And so, it becomes important to identify and 
evaluate a means of applying autonomy in such a way as to justify our actions and moral considerations. 
 
 LIBERTY AND THE INFOSPHERE: AFFILIATION OVER CITIZENSHIP – Craig Bregman (9405381W) – Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals – November 2017 
19 
It may be proffered that, minimally, one is required neither to demonstrate a high degree of authentic 
self-reflection nor competent deliberation in order to attain a sufficient measure of independence worthy 
of a satisfactory state of autonomy. Maximally, though, a person’s choice of values, as a precursor to 
independent deliberations of a self- and other-regarding kind, is what gives scope and meaning to her 
expression of authentic autonomy. And therefore, it may be argued that a person acting from a minimal 
position, without applying due moral regard for others, runs the risk of foreseeably violating the liberty 
of others. Instead, we are encouraged to apply a more comprehensive version of autonomy, constitutive 
of a sensitive and considered appreciation of one’s self- and other-regarding interests, drawing on a 
variety of available decision-making criteria with which to apply one’s authenticity and competency 
considerations, as well as one’s rational and relational assessments. This most thoroughly defines a 
sense of individual and collective purpose to which we are likely to be most enduringly drawn. This is 
because it exemplifies the principle of providing sound justifications for expressing a version of liberty 
based on rules designed to produce the best foreseen consequences for all involved. 
 
To test this claim, I assess what may be lost by discarding any of the four main conditions of personal 
and moral autonomy. 
• Authenticity: leading to a lack of clear self-interest to be otherwise drawn from a genuine 
commitment to one’s desires and value. 
• Competency: leading to a lack of independence to be otherwise gained from making decisions 
and choices for oneself. 
• Rational: leading to a lack of an enduring sense of freedom to be otherwise derived from 
recognising one’s inherent freedom and the same in others. 
• Relational: leading to a lack of comprehensive self-awareness to be otherwise attained from 
combining one’s reason with one’s psychological and emotional considerations. 
 
Discarding any of the conditions of autonomy may not automatically precipitate a reduction of liberty. 
Doing so does however leave a deficit of self-defining resources, which, when applied together, produce 
a more fully formed version of autonomy. Hence, in proportion to the objective of maximising liberty, 
one’s autonomy ought also to be maximised as fully as possible. 
 LIBERTY AND THE INFOSPHERE: AFFILIATION OVER CITIZENSHIP – Craig Bregman (9405381W) – Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals – November 2017 
20 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have provided an overview of the main features of autonomy. Furthermore, I have demonstrated why 
a comprehensive style of autonomy is necessary to promote a maximal version of liberty if such a 
version is attuned not only to one’s own interests but to the interests of others too. This, I believe, 
provides a good normative basis for pursuing liberty in an ethically sound manner. 
 
1.3. PURPOSE 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An exposition of positive and negative liberty as applied through individual purpose; 
• An explanation of how purpose ought to be optimised, aligning one’s positive and negative 
liberties by applying a comprehensive version of autonomy; 
• An explanation of how even opposing positions of purpose may be accommodated through the 
application of my proposed rule-consequentialist approach. 
 
ON PURPOSE 
Purpose stems in part from one’s interior will or ability to act. The capacity to act, referred to as positive 
liberty (Carter, 2012: p.1), is to varying degrees influenced by the limitations of one’s circumstances. 
The extent to which external factors permit or constrain one’s purpose is a matter then of negative 
liberty. (Ibid, 2012: p.1) Taken together, one expresses that which is positive (her will and capacity) 
against whatever is negative around her (her circumstances). Should these coalesce seamlessly, her 
purpose being proportional to the limitations of her circumstances, she may be said to occupy a space 
of optimal liberty. For example, if a person should wish to be alone in a small room without any prospect 
of ever leaving, then she will benefit from the optimal liberty of a term of solitary confinement. But if 
one’s intentions or circumstances, or a combination of both, are over or under extended, then a purpose-
deficit will occur. Examples include: expressing a position (one’s sexual orientation) in circumstances 
where one’s negative liberty is unreasonably censured, or, pursuing a position (attacking a secular 
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minority) in circumstances where one’s positive liberty ought to be constrained. Both examples fail as 
a result of their bad, or morally impermissible consequences. Neither one’s sexual orientation nor one’s 
beliefs are in and of themselves wrong; by the same token, nor are any opposing perspectives on either 
matter. In both examples, however, the acts of violating another’s liberty, by censuring their sexual 
orientation (thereby diminishing their life prospects) or attacking them based on their secular beliefs 
(thereby harming them physically), are morally impermissible. Even if enacted in total self-interest (as 
if on grounds of ethical egoism) nonetheless, these violations betray an over-extension of will on the 
part of the perpetrators leading to punitive circumstances for the victims. Furthermore, they belie a 
comprehensive application of autonomy in that they most obviously lack the other-regarding 
considerations included under the condition of rational precedence which recognises their own inherent 
freedom but also the freedom of others. How then can these diametrically opposed positions be 
simultaneously accommodated? Taking the more controversial line of viewing the situation from the 
perspective of the perpetrators (being the legislator criminalising certain sexual orientations, or the 
religious extremist targeting secular advocates) we must assess the extent to which the perpetrators’ 
interests are unreasonably violated by the presence of the others. At most, the perpetrators might claim 
that their life prospects are diminished by encountering the positions and beliefs of their ‘opponents’. 
They certainly could not reasonably claim that they suffer direct physical harm. Nonetheless, even the 
first claim seems weak. And within the context of liberty it requires that all the main features of liberty 
– individual uniqueness, diversity, non-tyranny of prejudice, non-harm – be discarded in preference to 
an egoism without consideration of others. Therefore, I contend that the narrowest means of 
accommodating these opposed positions is to enable everyone, as far as is possible, to secure their 
interests and interact freely to promote them without coercing the non-consensual participation or 
subjugation of others. On this view, the feature of diversity may be partially elided, but it cannot be 
completely excluded. This version requires that individuals align their positive and negative liberties as 
much as they can; they have to apply all the conditions of their autonomy in contending with the 
unavoidable limitations of their personal and circumstantial conditions so as to maximise their purpose, 
individually as well as collectively. This objective is what requires the protection of certain rules of a 
rule-consequentialist approach, as well as the environment capable of enabling individuals and 
collectives to maximise their liberty. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have demonstrated how a maximal version of liberty includes one’s positive and negative liberty. 
One’s purpose is drawn from the alignment of one’s positive and negative liberty. However, this does 
not amount to ethical egoism. It is only with due regard for a comprehensive application of autonomy 
that one’s purpose may be said to meet the normative requirements of a permissible expression of 
liberty. This requires that one respect the liberty of others. 
 
Now that we have examined liberty, autonomy and purpose, and given reasons for why a 
consequentialist approach of applying liberty is well suited to promoting good outcomes, based on rules 
which give equal consideration to each person’s value in a way that has foreseen or intended benefits, 
I want to turn our attention towards the theme of Individuals and collectives, pertinent given the sense 
I have that liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, 
by extension, collective purpose. 
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2. FROM LIBERTY TO INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVES 
As stated in the section on liberty, Mill establishes the individual as the primary agent of liberty. Only 
following moral consideration of the individual first can the collective interest be developed further. 
This is not an endorsement of ethical egoism though, which “is an ethical theory to the effect that one 
ought always to act in one’s own best interests [and] that an action is right if and only if it benefits the 
agent.” (Mautner, 2005: p.180) Liberty includes broader considerations of others too, including the 
recognition of others’ freedom and their ability to pursue their own interests. On this, and the rule-
consequentialist approach of avoiding foreseeably impermissible consequences, it is important to 
recognise the underlying feature of agency. In other words, liberty ought to be expressed with due 
consideration and awareness, that is, non-arbitrarily. The significance of this is highlighted by briefly 
comparing the concept of affiliation to that of citizenship. To affiliate is to choose to affiliate, whereas 
citizenship is arbitrarily assumed at birth. Therefore, on a view of maximising one’s negative liberty, 
affiliation affords the means of actively realigning one’s collective interests with one’s self-interest. 
And, as individuals, subscribing to an identity which, I will argue, can be prolifically (and virtually) 
comprised of multiple interests, we ought to be free to select, augment and pursue what is in our best 
interest from a range of available options. Therefore, in the section that follows I address the following: 
• How individuals may express their identities in ways comprised of multiple interests; 
• How collectives ought ideally to be formed from the voluntary, as in non-arbitrary, initiative of 
their members; 
• And how this view calls into question our conception of citizenship as it applies to the 
organisation of moral norms of liberty among shifting global societies. 
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3. INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVES 
3.1. IDENTITY 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An exposition of three main theories of identity, namely, the psychological, the biological and 
the narrative; 
• A version of identity drawing on a combination of the psychological/narrative theories and 
demonstrate how such a version correlates to an expression of autonomy and purpose;  
• A distinction between two conceptions of identity, namely, primary and prolific. 
• A description of primary identity, consisting in data and traits which are specific to a person. 
• A description of prolific identity, a poly-narrative composite comprised of multiple interests, a 
conception of identity better attuned to a maximal version of liberty and one which may be 
ideally expressed online. 
 
ON IDENTITY 
Of the philosophical theories of identity generally discussed, three are pertinent to my report, namely 
the psychological, the biological and the narrative. 
 
“The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity… [includes] psychological continuity [which] 
consists in overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness, itself consisting in significant 
numbers of direct psychological connections like memories, intentions, beliefs/goals/desires, and 
similarity of character.” (Shoemaker, referencing Parfit, 2014: p.10) In “The Biological Criterion of 
Personal Identity… X=Y [over time] if and only if Y’s biological organism is continuous with X’s 
biological organism.” (Shoemaker, referencing Olson and DeGrazia, 2014: p.11) Finally, “The 
Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity [claims that] what makes an action, experience, or 
psychological characteristic properly attributable to some person… is its correct incorporation into the 
self-told story of his or her life.” (Shoemaker, referencing MacIntyre, Taylor, Schechtman and 
DeGrazia, 2014: p.15). 
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Regarding the biological criterion, David Shoemaker provides the analogy of a brain transplant. He 
notes that the recipient assumes the psychological characteristics of the donor. He therefore argues, 
successfully I think, that our physical characteristics count for less than our psychological 
characteristics in defining who we are. (Shoemaker, 2014: pp.36-37) Similarly, Luciano Floridi 
observes that our online experience is less about our physical immutability (a biological criterion), and 
far more about our intangible interactions (Floridi, 2013: p.10), interactions that are constituted 
psychologically and narratively. That said, is there a significant relationship between identity 
(psychological and narrative) and liberty? Do the intangible features of the former correspond with 
features of the latter? And can a certain conception of identity affect our liberty, and, if so, can its effects 
be maximising? 
 
On the first two questions: 
• The psychological criteria of identity, which include intentions, beliefs, goals and desires, 
accord with the authenticity and competency conditions of personal autonomy. 
• Applying these criteria socially, with like-regard for the interests of others, requires that we 
employ the rational and relational conditions of moral autonomy. 
• Having the will and ability to act and adapt to circumstances, pursuing one’s purpose over a 
lifetime of experience gives content to the self-told story of one’s life. 
• Therefore, psychologically and narratively, one’s sense of identity corresponds to one’s liberty 
in the form of autonomy and purpose. 
• In other words, one’s liberty is inextricably tied to an expression of one’s identity too. 
 
I shall now make a distinction between two types of identity which are pertinent to the third question. 
 
The first is what I will call primary identity. 
 
Primary identity consists of the data about a person which are specific and immutable, for example, a 
physical likeness in the form of a photograph, a statistical instance in the form of an identity number, 
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and a traceable instance in the form of an address. These data are specific in that they apply to a 
particular person; they are immutable because they apply to that person entirely. Together they are 
coordinatable to provide a fixed impression and position of a person. In other words, they render 
someone identifiable and locatable. Primary identity may also include character traits (comprised of 
beliefs, positions and interests) expressed over time. These traits provide an idea of who someone is. 
So, we come to construct an identikit of a person – we have immutable data about their distinguishing 
features and whereabouts and interpretive information about their attitudes and behaviours. From these 
coordinatable pieces, someone can be tracked down and either killed or prosecuted (recall the secular 
blogger in Bangladesh and the LGBTI communities in at least 76 countries, both cases mentioned in 
my introduction). 
 
The distinguishing characteristics of primary data – specific, immutable, coordinatable – can impact 
one’s liberty negatively. They also apply to a person in a very local way, by which I mean, they point 
to someone in the physical sense of their actual person and location. And, we can and do discriminate 
against primary identities. However, is there a way of conceiving of a different type of identity; a 
conception of identity that may be better suited to the intangible world of the internet where everything 
is in a sense ephemeral and remote, by which I mean online and virtual? And, if there is such a 
conception, is it capable of expanding the horizons of liberty, presenting more options, providing greater 
means of expressing and testing one’s opinions, offering a broader spectrum of association than that 
available to one on the ground so to speak? 
 
This brings me to the second type of identity, what I call prolific identity. 
 
As a starting point for understanding this conception of prolific identity, I refer to Luciano Floridi’s 
suggestion that “[we] ‘identify’ (provide identities) to each other, and this is a crucial… variable in a 
complex game of the construction of personal identities, especially when the opportunities to socialize 
are multiplied and modified by new [Information and Communication Technologies].” (Floridi, 2013: 
p.215) In other words, one’s expression of identity is far greater in a virtual environment where the 
parameters of interaction are extended. Recalling that interaction of a self-expansive kind (among 
individuals and collectives partial to a proliferation of opinions with which to augment and refine their 
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self-interests) is central to the project of maximising liberty, a conception of fully identifying with 
oneself and fully expressing one’s sense of identity is desirable. But what does it mean to express 
oneself fully in this way? 
 
In the context of my report, and, at this juncture, with the intention of only highlighting some key 
features, it means the following: 
• From the perspective of liberty – to express one’s interests in accord or competition with the 
interests of other’s in an environment thriving from diversity. 
• From the perspective of libertarianism – to exercise self-ownership free (as in, as free as 
possible) from external interference or constraint. 
• From the perspective of rule-consequentialism, as I have applied it – to pursue liberty by 
applying a minimal set of rules with which to safeguard the interests of individuals and 
collectives on the basis of sound moral consequences. 
 
Prolific identity, expressed online, can, in its most expansive sense, be a poly-narrative composite of 
multiple interests. Furthermore, these interests can be expressed in ways that may not always be 
practically feasible. For example, I may want to express myself as multiple genders in different 
relationships, or, I may want to express political views that are at odds with my religious convictions. 
And by applying Mill’s harm principle as a negative constraint whereby a position or practice in and of 
itself is not harmful, expressing prolific identity in this way is, in and of itself, harmless. Only if one’s 
intentions in doing so are to inflict harm, is the act of presenting a position morally impermissible. (This 
will be further addressed below in the sections on online privacy and unrestricted access.) But it is also 
important to understand that prolific identity, in its thinnest sense, may just as legitimately comprise 
even a single interest. In the final analysis, prolific identity is intended to compensate for (or at least 
attempt to do so) instances where one’s primary identity renders one incapable of pursuing one’s life 
purpose. Where, for example, one’s beliefs or sexual orientation make one a target offline, online one’s 
identity and liberty ought to be safeguarded from this type of harm. And because one’s primary and 
prolific identities are conjoined in the same moral agent, the way in which liberty is pursued and 
maximised online must be morally regulated so as to avoid harm to innocents, both online and offline. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this section, I argued for a combination of the psychological/narrative account of identity. I 
demonstrated how such a version is suited to the expression of autonomy and purpose. I then 
distinguished between two conceptions of identity. Primary identity is that which defines one based on 
specific data and traits. It is what renders one locatable, and, to an extent knowable. It is, in a sense, a 
definition of one’s offline existence. On the other hand, prolific identity is a conception comprised of 
potentially many more multiple interests. It represents the ability to express oneself in ways which may 
not be feasible offline. As such, it is attuned to an online environment. And it allows for the 
exemplification of the expression of liberty. 
  
 LIBERTY AND THE INFOSPHERE: AFFILIATION OVER CITIZENSHIP – Craig Bregman (9405381W) – Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals – November 2017 
29 
3.2. VOLUNTARY AFFILIATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• A description of affiliation’s appeal to collective interest, and voluntarism’s non-coercive 
commitment to moral action; 
• An explanation of the important feature of being able to voluntarily enter and exit affiliations; 
• A demonstration of voluntary affiliation’s ability to enable the expression of prolific identity; 
• A validation of the conscientious participation of all those involved in voluntary affiliation ; 
• An explanation of why such an initiative requires an environment that is porous.  
 
ON VOLUNTARY AFFILIATION 
Affiliation concerns the act of uniting in action or interest. 
(http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affiliation?s=t) Voluntarism includes “the view that obligations 
(legal or moral) can arise for a person only by means of a voluntary undertaking [under conditions of 
non-coercion].” (Mautner, 2005: p.649) Affiliation is consistent with the requirements of autonomy and 
purpose – one acts in accordance with personal autonomy (self-interest) and moral autonomy 
(collective-regarding interest); committing to action (exhibiting positive liberty), in an environment 
conducive to collective union (affording negative liberty). Similarly, voluntarism stems from one’s 
interest in a collective scheme, and includes the principle of non-coercion, a substantive feature of 
Mill’s harm principle. The notion here of obligation is derived from a person’s commitment to action, 
an action, which, on a consequentialist view, is anticipated will result in intended or foreseen good, or, 
at least, a better good than any other available action might achieve. 
 
Voluntary affiliation also includes the ability to enter and exit a collective at will. As with the theme of 
self-discovery, first highlighted in section 1.1. on liberty, and recalled in section 3.1. on identity, we 
may find that our affiliations change with our changing interests: interests are either modified or 
discarded, so too are our affiliations. This requires a freedom of movement, or a porosity of interaction. 
In section 3.1., I presented the concept of prolific identity. One’s prolific identity allows for expressive 
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possibilities that in reality may be difficult or even impossible to realise. Theoretically, though, 
voluntary affiliations enable us to traverse barriers and engage in a variety of experiences. The feature 
of diversity in a single agent drawn to a range of interests, some even mutually antagonistic, promotes 
an ideal of liberty, which can extend to prolific agents across multiple affiliations. For example, Citizen 
A of Country Y and Citizen B of Country Z would ordinarily be friends, despite the war between their 
countries and the conflict of their cultures. Congruously, Citizen X (of Country Nondescript) 
sympathises simultaneously with the respective political positions of Country Y and Country Z, with 
Citizen A and Citizen B, and with aspects of their respective cultures. Let us assume that Citizens A 
and B have no way of actively fostering their friendship. In other words, they cannot overcome the 
impediments restricting the expression of their mutual interests, because they are physically and 
ideologically hardship-bound by the limitations of their circumstances. By contrast, let us assume that 
Citizen X has access to the resources necessary to pursue a range of interests and affiliations, including 
her sympathies with aspects of Citizen A’s and B’s respective predicaments. In so doing, Citizen X 
elevates a unifying good between Citizens A and B, somewhat in absentia, by marrying the possibility 
of their shared interests while also casting a charitable light on various features of their respective 
cultures. The point, though, of this analogy, while committed to a sense of common good, is primarily 
to demonstrate that the ability to affiliate voluntarily ought to feature prominently in any project to do 
with liberty. This is because affiliation is instrumentally valuable in that it propels us into action; 
voluntary affiliation is furthermore contributively valuable in that it imbues our collective-forming 
initiatives with a genuine sense of conscientious participation. Other examples include Person D whose 
political persuasions disqualify her from openly expressing herself in an environment where she would 
be persecuted for doing so; or Person E whose interfaith beliefs do not ‘practically’ cohere; or Person 
F who identifies transnationally and transgenderly while in reality possessing only one passport and 
one gender. How liberating it would be for Persons D, E and F if they could affiliate voluntarily so as 
to express rather than conceal themselves in an environment, or space, with a high degree of porosity 
conducive to multiple, simultaneous and seamless affiliations. 
 
Within an environment such as this, no one is necessarily split between interests, which is to say, no 
one has to ‘trespass’ from one interest or identity to another. Instead, we retain our identities, affiliating 
meaningfully and freely. We unite in action and interest, intra- and inter-personally, and we commit 
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ourselves to the realisation of both our self- and other-regarding concerns. From a consequentialist 
standpoint, voluntary affiliation contributes to the claim that liberty is exemplified, in the form of 
autonomy, through the expression of individual and, by extension, collective purpose in the following 
way: 
• Someone who contributes to the collective interest does so purposefully if in so doing she 
expresses a sense of conscientious participation; 
• A collective thus comprised validates the interests and intentions of its members; 
• Arguably, one’s membership – affiliation – ought to be voluntary if by belonging one hopes to 
benefit from an enduring sense of individual and collective purpose; 
• The implications of these formulations are morally significant if they serve to underscore the 
intrinsic well-being of the individuals and the collectives involved. 
 
Hence, the task now is that of identifying the environment and the means of expressing our prolific 
identities and voluntary affiliations most meaningfully. While I have made it clear that I believe the 
internet to be such an environment, it is important to first examine the concept of citizenship given that 
it most obviously concerns the interests of people living in large-scale societies.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I have demonstrated that the feature of voluntary affiliation endorses non-coercive, collective-forming 
enterprises, and includes the feature of porosity, allowing people to enter and exit affiliations at will. 
As such, it is adept at accommodating the aspirations of our prolific identities. This is accounted for in 
the explanation of how through affiliating voluntarily we can traverse, as opposed to trespass, multiple 
self-conceptions. This now propels me towards identifying an ideal environment for furthering the 
project of liberty, which has come to include the concepts of prolific identity and voluntary affiliation. 
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3.3. CITIZENSHIP 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• A description of the main aspects of citizenship; 
• An explanation of citizenship’s arbitrary nature; 
• A brief discussion of some of the main theories of citizenship; 
• An explanation of why citizenship cannot necessarily accommodate a maximising version of 
liberty, especially one drawn from the expression of prolific identity and pursued through 
voluntary affiliation. 
 
ON CITIZENSHIP 
Wayne Norman and Will Kymlicka distinguish “four interrelated aspects of” citizenship, namely, our: 
• Legal status: “[This includes] the specific legal rights and obligations which attach to the status 
of citizen.” 
• Sense of identity: “[The importance] that the status of citizenship mean something to 
individuals; in other words, that they identify with their political community, cherish their 
membership in it, and even feel a certain pride about it.” 
• Position of solidarity with others: “The belief that citizenship should serve as a locus – perhaps 
the primary locus – for community and solidarity.” 
• Meaningful commitment to civic virtue: “[The belief that] citizens have the right, and perhaps 
also the duty, to participate actively and responsibly in the political, social, and cultural 
betterment of their community.” (Norman and Kymlicka, 2005: p.211)  
 
Norman and Kymlicka proffer a version of citizenship founded on rights and obligations (legal status 
and civic virtue respectively) enhanced by a sense of personal belonging and communal well-being 
(through identity and solidarity with others). As favourable a version as this is, it seems to rely upon a 
negative imperative: citizenship must compel us to feel charitably about ourselves and our civil/political 
community. But what if someone, Citizen X, feels ostracised, because of her contrary political or 
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personal position, such that she lacks a dignified sense of identity, does not enjoy a sense of solidarity 
with others and does not feel committed to any kind of civic virtue? Or, less opposed, she feels only 
partially aligned with some of the privileges of her citizenship? What is it about citizenship that does 
not quite correlate with an optimal view of positive liberty? I contend that it pertains to its arbitrary 
nature – we have no choice over where we are born. Hence, from the outset, citizenship has to contend 
with the complexities of accommodating arbitrarily-placed citizens who may upon reflection feel 
otherwise about the purported benefits of their citizenship. 
 
Citizenship is a very complex matter. Indeed, all models of citizenship, of which there are many, aim 
to define a set of reasonable limitations within which citizenship may be comprehensively exercised 
and appreciated. Republicanism advocates “civic self-rule.” (Leydet, 2014: p.4) Liberalism promotes 
“[private] citizenship primarily as a legal status.” (Ibid, 2014: p.5) Feminist theorists have concatenated 
the political into a context of shared public and private experience, arguing in the round for a more 
thorough version of citizenship, (Ibid, 2014: p.7). And universalists have sought to transcend difference 
and unify people along lines of common interest. (Ibid, 2014: p.16) But, as Dominique Leydet observes, 
the “internal diversity of contemporary liberal democracies [and] the pressures wrought by 
globalization on the territorial, sovereign state” (Ibid, 2014: p.1) have forced a re-examination of the 
concept of citizenship. 
 
To my mind, drawing on a criticism of universalism, “an alternative conception of citizenship based on 
the acknowledgment of the political relevance of difference (cultural, gender, class, race, etc.) … 
[including] the recognition of the pluralist character of the democratic public, composed of many 
perspectives, none of which should be considered a priori more legitimate” (Ibid, 2014: p.1) strikes a 
better chord. While citizenship, in its various forms, may present the only viable means of arranging 
large-scale societies on the ground, its arbitrary, nation-state bound predicament seems incompatible 
with an agency-centred model of liberty in which individuals arrange their affiliations according to their 
interests. Some of the key features of liberty – autonomy, purpose, freedom of expression and affiliation 
– are not the same as the aspects of citizenship proposed by Norman and Kymlicka. Norman and 
Kymlicka go so far as to concede that when it comes to identity, “citizenship identity competes with 
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private individualistic interests… and [also with] membership of other sorts of “identity groups” defined 
by religion, gender, ethnicity, or sexual preference (sic).” (Norman and Kymlicka, 2005: p.211)  
  
While some now “claim that citizenship can be exercised in a multiplicity of ‘sites’ both below and 
above the nation-state” (Leydet, 2014: p.22) I contend that this does not necessarily amount to a 
maximising theory of liberty. Closer to the cause is the “development of transnational civil society… 
[whereby] networks coalesce around a common ideology or conception of the good… composed of 
voluntary associations organized around shared interests.” (Ibid, 2014: p.37) Signaling a progressive 
orientation towards the value of voluntary affiliations, these initiatives extend the political initiative 
beyond the arbitrary bounds of citizenship. However, they perhaps stop short of accommodating the 
proliferations of a prolific identity-oriented theory of liberty, eminent within each of us and outside the 
scope of any citizenship-centred project. 
 
On a final note, even in the most liberally inclusive societies, “the specific legal rights and obligations 
which attach to the status of citizen” (Norman and Kymlicka, 2005: p.211) are to some extent partial to 
the laws and customs of that particular society. Therefore, I contest that an optimal state of liberty 
cannot be accommodated within the concept of citizenship, but that it has to be sought outside the 
nation-state in an environment more porous and more conducive to liberty’s requirements. This leads 
me then to an exploration of the infosphere, and more specifically a sub-region of the infosphere, the 
internet. 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have shown that the concept of citizenship is arbitrarily bound by nation-state laws and customs. As 
such, even though its main aspects are admirable, it cannot guarantee liberty. Furthermore, even though 
there are several competing theoretical versions of liberty, none can necessarily aspire to a maximising 
version of liberty. For such a version, one must identify an environment that enables freer forms of 
expression and association. My task now is that of exploring the potential of maximising liberty online. 
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4. LIBERTY OFFLINE VERSUS LIBERTY ONLINE 
In the chapter of his book, The Ethics of Information, entitled, ‘The informational nature of selves’, 
Luciano Floridi observes that “[h]uman life is quickly becoming a matter of onlife experience.” (Floridi, 
2013: p.210) He describes the “onlife experience [as] the digital-online… spilling over into the 
analogue-offline and merging with it.” (Ibid, 2013: p.8) Despite this merging, are there significant 
differences between an online and an offline experience? And, if there are differences, do they in any 
way affect how we go about expressing liberty online as opposed to offline? 
 
At this juncture, it may be helpful to recount some of the main claims I have made about liberty and 
individuals and collectives thus far. 
 
In my introduction, as part of detailing the structure of this report, I advanced the following schematic 
of how liberty might be maximally pursued and expressed online: 
• Broadly speaking, liberty concerns self-interest and, morally and politically, the interests of 
others.  
• Liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, by 
extension, collective purpose.  
• One’s autonomy pertains to oneself personally and to others morally. 
• Positively, purpose entails the will and ability to act and, negatively, the absence of 
impediments to this action. 
• Individuals subscribe to an identity, which I will argue can be prolifically (and virtually) 
comprised of multiple interests. 
• Collectives are ideally formed from the voluntary initiative of their members. 
• Individuals, expressing themselves prolifically, through voluntary affiliations with others can 
do so most readily online.  
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On the specific issue of liberty, drawing on a version proffered by John Stuart Mill, I summed up Mill’s 
position as follows: 
• It is impermissible to silence an opinion which may be true; 
• Diversity is a vital characteristic of a thriving environment open to multiple opinions; 
• Individuals ought to be free to choose what they know is in their best self-interest; 
• Self- and other-regarding considerations of liberty ought to be exercised freely without bringing 
harm to others or impeding their ability to achieve the same; 
• The individual’s ultimate purpose is to give free reign to her pursuit of liberty and well-being. 
 
Distilling the above into a summation of critical features to do with the liberty of individuals and 
collectives, on my view and in the context of this report, a minimal set of criteria ought to at least 
include the following: 
• The absence of impediments to individual and/or collective liberty. 
• The construction of prolific individual identity. 
• The enablement of voluntary collective affiliation. 
• The promotion of diversity of and access to multiple opinions. 
 
With these features in mind, I propose comparing their application online versus offline to ascertain if 
there are firstly any significant differences in experience between the two environments and, assuming 
there are, if secondly these differences cast a new light on the benefit of pursuing liberty online. 
 
Regarding the absence of impediments: 
• New information communication technologies often precipitate an increase and acceleration of 
interaction among people. 
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• A few examples illustrate the point – letter to telegraph; telegraph to telephone; telephone to 
online social media. 
• In each instance, the barriers of time and distance are reduced such that the communication is 
increasingly faster and/or richer. 
  
Regarding the construction of prolific individual identity: 
• People may manifest and express a range of personas/identities in their everyday lives. 
• Someone may present a certain version of herself to her family at home which is different from 
that which she presents to her colleagues at work and so on. 
• So, the ability to express oneself variously is not in question. 
• That said, it seems to me that in an offline environment someone cannot simultaneously express 
more than one persona at a time. 
• However, online, it is possible to be more than one persona and to also expand the range of 
personas one is capable of manifesting, simultaneously and across distance and time. 
 
Regarding the enablement of voluntary collective affiliation: 
• People affiliate to communities and causes in their everyday lives. 
• So, the ability to affiliate is not in question. 
• That said, there are instances in many countries where certain affiliations are either prohibited 
or difficult for people to pursue safely. 
• However, online, it may be easier to express these affiliations if doing so online better avoids 
the risk of being in direct harm’s way. 
• Furthermore, in instances where people cannot pursue their goals to affiliate because the 
community or cause is not available to them in their offline environment, they may seek out 
these affiliations online. 
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Regarding the promotion of diversity of and access to multiple opinions: 
• It is reasonable to assume that people have neither the capacity nor the desire really to pursue 
an ungraspable range of opinions from all corners of the world. 
• That said, it is reasonable to acknowledge that when given the opportunity, people often do 
benefit from encountering diversity, both from the point of view of broadening their knowledge 
of the world and potentially expanding their own scope of interest. 
• As with the features above, the potential to access a broader range of opinions, that is, to enter 
an environment comprised of greater diversity, is greatly extended online by comparison to 
what is likely available offline. 
 
Based on the above, I contend that an online environment offers greater scope for pursuing, expressing 
and maximising liberty. And so, recalling the question I posed at the beginning of my introduction, 
what are the correct normative strategies and applied procedures for furthering liberty online? The next 
section on the infosphere addresses this question. 
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5. THE INFOSPHERE / THE INTERNET 
5.1. THE INFOSPHERE / THE INTERNET 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An explanation of the informational nature of the internet; 
• A description of the informational nature of human beings; 
• An explanation of Luciano Floridi’s Levels of Abstraction, by which the informational nature 
of people is exposed; 
• A discussion of Levels of Particularisation, by which prolific identity can be expressed; 
• A validation of the consequential good that can be achieved through expressing prolific identity 
online; 
• A caution regarding the potential dangers associated with online design techniques intended to 
exploit our online vulnerabilities. 
 
ON THE INFOSPHERE / THE INTERNET 
Luciano Floridi coined the neologism, the infosphere. “Minimally, [it] denotes the whole informational 
environment constituted by all informational entities (thus including information agents as well), their 
properties, interactions, processes, and mutual relations.” (Floridi, 2013: p.6) Smart appliances, social 
networks, and data servers are informational entities: they produce, transmit, receive, interpret, and act 
upon information. So too are photographs, identity numbers, addresses and tombstones: they may not 
be able to receive and interpret information, but they do produce and transmit it. Humans are, in essence, 
Floridi’s inforgs – “informationally embodied organisms”, (Ibid, 2013: p.14) whose powers of reception 
and response are, based alone on comprehensive conditions of autonomy, more complex than those of 
other entities. Arguing for the ethical consideration of information, Floridi employs a method of Levels 
of Abstraction (LOA) (Floridi, 2013: p.32; Floridi, 2014: p.52) to show how informational availability 
abstracts from the detail of a human being into that of a mammal and more distantly a collection of 
basic elements. Like an identity number, these become informational connectors of ‘human’ value. 
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Dimensionally, “[the infosphere] is an environment comparable to, but different from, cyberspace [the 
internet / online], which is only one of its sub-regions, as it were, since it also includes offline and 
analogue spaces of information.” (Floridi, 2013: p.6) In other words, information is ubiquitous. Online, 
inforgs can engage in relations with other inforgs and informational entities through intangible 
interactions. Offline, these interactions are more readily tangible. Nonetheless, I want to clarify that 
‘prolific’ and ‘primary’ are not mutually exclusive to ‘online’ and ‘offline’ respectively. One may reveal 
aspects of one’s primary identity online as well as pursue certain prolific interests offline. As argued in 
the previous section, though, the potential to generate interests, personas, and affiliations is greater 
online than offline. Online, inforgs can plot the course of LOA in the opposite direction, employing 
what I call (adapting Floridi) a method of Levels of Particularisation (LOP). Drawing from a wider 
variety of available options, inforgs can particularise and manifest (maximise and optimise) a range of 
interests, personas, and affiliations. And if, on “[assessing] the goodness of the consequences”, (Hooker, 
2016: p.2) we find that by optimising our interests, affiliations, and personas, we produce “acts and/or 
character traits [prolific identities], practices [interests], and institutions [voluntary affiliations]” (Ibid, 
2016: p.2) that enhance our individual and collective liberty, then our LOP are morally sound. 
 
But are digital technologies (the building blocks, design elements and/or tenants of the internet) 
designed to enhance our liberty? James Williams strikes a telling note of caution: “Digital technologies 
privilege our impulses over our intentions. They are increasingly designed to exploit our psychological 
vulnerabilities in order to direct us toward goals that may or may not align with our own… [that] a 
primary effect of digital technologies is thus to undermine the operation and even development of the 
human will. This militates against the possibility of all forms of self-determination at both individual 
and collective levels.” (Williams, 2017: http://ninedotsprize.org/extracts-stand-light-freedom-
persuasion-attention-economy/) Hence, on Williams’ account, rather than attain a sense of freedom, 
online we may actually suffer a diminishment of purpose. 
 
In summary, Williams advances the following argument: 
1. Digital technologies usurp our attention and exploit our psychological vulnerabilities; 
2. They do this by employing persuasive, as in potentially coercive, designs; 
3. Therefore, online, we may be (mis)directed away from our genuine interests. 
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And: 
4. As a result of this (mis)direction; 
5. We may suffer a diminishment of our life prospects (without even realising it). 
 
In respect of human beings as inforgs, (1), (2), (3) and (5) are direct violations of the harm principle. 
(1) and (2) are more particularly violations of the libertarian imperatives of minimal external 
interference in and non-coercion of one’s right to liberty. Furthermore, in respect of how other 
informational entities operate, the use of exploitative mechanisms that undermine the tenets of liberty, 
such as freedom of will and choice in an environment conducive to diversity, violates a rule-
consequentialism of equal consideration of each entity’s value. It also maligns the potential of achieving 
consequences of foreseen value in liberty when the intention is to actively subvert certain critical tenets 
of liberty. 
 
Williams proposes that “we must… move urgently to assert and defend our freedom of attention…” He 
adds that “We can find precedent for such a freedom in Mill when he writes, in On Liberty, that the 
‘appropriate region of human liberty’ … ‘comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness’ … 
‘liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative.’ ‘This principle,’ [Mill] writes, ‘requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan 
of our life to suit our own character.’” (Williams, 2017: http://ninedotsprize.org/extracts-stand-light-
freedom-persuasion-attention-economy/) 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine by what rules the integrity of informational ‘human’ value may 
be safeguarded online, and to what extent these rules may be limited as to primarily maximise liberty 
without leaving it over-permissively vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have demonstrated that the informational nature of the internet and human beings presents conditions 
conducive to expressing prolific identity and maximising liberty. However, I have also exposed some 
of the dangers of online design directed at exploiting human psychological vulnerabilities and thus 
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undermining liberty. With this in mind it is important to determine how interaction online ought to be 
directed so as to produce sound moral outcomes. I now turn to the features of privacy and unrestricted 
access as they pertain to the protection of our prolific identities and the promotion of our voluntary 
affiliations online. 
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5.2. PRIVACY 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• An explanation of the informational property of identity online; 
• A distinction between anonymity and privacy; 
• An argument of why a breach of informational privacy involves a violation of one’s identity 
and liberty; 
• Two accounts of why informational privacy is beneficial to liberty; 
• An explanation of the place and role of privacy within my rule-consequentialist approach. 
 
ON PRIVACY 
Floridi states that “informational privacy… [must take] into account the essentially informational nature 
of human beings and… their operations as social agents.” (Floridi, 2006: p.111) Online, these 
operations entail intangible interactions among inforgs (and other informational entities). Floridi 
continues: “Such re-interpretation [of the informational nature of human beings] is achieved by 
considering each individual as constituted by his or her information…” (information that applies to 
LOAs and LOPs) “… and hence by understanding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of 
aggression towards one’s personal identity.” (Ibid, 2006: p.111) So, online, we are our information 
(Ibid, 2006: p.111) and we ought not to suffer a violation of that which is intrinsically us, namely our 
identities. Furthermore, Floridi notes that “we never stop becoming ourselves, so protecting a person’s 
informational privacy also means allowing that person the freedom to change, ontologically.” (Ibid, 
2006: p.112) This sounds like a freedom of self-expression, of exploration and adaptation to changing 
interests, a freedom to manifest and, on my view, to do so optimally, that is, prolifically. 
 
While the virtues of privacy are well appreciated, what are the concerns? On the subject of anonymity, 
Kathleen Wallace “characterize[s] the issue of accountability in relation to anonymity as [Plato’s] Ring 
of Gyges scenario. [This] scenario is when someone’s ability to be invisible – anonymous – allows 
unethical or criminal action with impunity.” (Wallace, 1999: p.31) But are anonymity and privacy the 
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same? Wallace explains that “anonymity obtains when it is known that someone (or some people) exists 
but who it is (or they are) is unknown – the action or trait in virtue of which someone is known to exist 
is not coordinatable with other traits of the person(s).” (Ibid, 1999: p.25) In other words, anonymity 
occurs following the de-compilation of one’s identity to the extent where she is no longer knowable. It 
therefore “ensure[s] privacy.” (Ibid, 1999: p.29) Privacy, however, functions differently. With privacy, 
one’s data is not necessarily decompiled but concealed, as with the example of a private folder of 
personal details kept under lock and key. The act of concealment shields one from undue scrutiny or 
“undesirable intrusions”. (Allen, 2000: p.1108) In other words, privacy can “facilitate communication 
[affiliations], to avoid reprisals, and so on.” (Wallace, 1999: p.29) A complete absence of privacy 
precipitates a complete absence of anonymity, but the reverse is not necessarily the case; one can 
surrender anonymity and still maintain privacy. Importantly, my focus is on the function of privacy and 
not anonymity. The relevance of this distinction centres on the weight of moral responsibility. The 
intention behind a rule-consequentialist approach of maximising liberty online is to strengthen the moral 
legitimacy of my argument. A feature, such as anonymity, prone to abuse of the Ring of Gyges kind 
will weaken my position. 
 
Simply put, my argument goes as follows: 
• Online, one is synonymous with one’s informational nature; 
• A breach of informational privacy is a violation of one’s informational nature, that is, one’s 
identity; 
• One’s (prolific) identity is a critical element of one’s liberty; 
• Therefore, privacy is an important safeguard of the integrity of one’s liberty. 
• Furthermore, because privacy is the concealment but not the de-compilation of one’s identity, 
rule-consequentially, should someone commit direct harm against someone else, the 
perpetrator’s identity can and ought to be revealed. This ensures that we are never over-
permissively relieved of the important aspect of taking moral responsibility for what we do. 
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So as to defend a position on privacy, I want to examine two scenarios. The first has to do with avoiding 
undue scrutiny; the second has to do with promoting mutual interests. In both scenarios, privacy 
functions to conceal primary identity with the foreseen consequences of promoting liberty. 
  
Scenario 1 concerns Person G. 
• Person G agrees with aspects of Ideology X and Ideology Y; 
• She is drawn to certain features of Faith 1 and Faith 2; 
• She expresses herself variously as multiple genders across a spectrum of orientations; 
• She identifies with some of the political perspectives of her citizen Country H as well as of 
Country I. 
Assuming that none of the positions held by Person G are in and of themselves morally impermissible, 
and that Person G is without privacy, then: 
• If her positions are considered compatible by others and/or the laws of state or custom, Person 
G is unlikely to attract undue scrutiny; but 
• If her positions are considered incompatible by others and/or the laws of state or custom, Person 
G may suffer undue scrutiny; therefore 
• Person G ought to have the benefit of privacy so as to express herself freely. 
   
Scenario 2 concerns Person A and Person B. 
• Persons A and B are neighbours; 
• However, they refuse to associate with another on account of their opposing political positions; 
• Yet, they share a common passion for Interest C; 
Assuming they are in a perpetual state of transparency: 
• Persons A and B will remain hostile to one another; but 
• Assuming they attain a state of privacy; 
• Persons A and B might affiliate around their common interest. 
 
 LIBERTY AND THE INFOSPHERE: AFFILIATION OVER CITIZENSHIP – Craig Bregman (9405381W) – Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals – November 2017 
46 
Both scenarios pursue the foreseen objective of yielding good consequences. For Person A this entails 
freedom from undue scrutiny while pursuing her prolific interests; for Persons A and B this entails 
overcoming their differences so as to pursue their mutual interests. Privacy enables this to happen. 
Without privacy, the potential to produce good is compromised. Contributively then, privacy may work 
to lower one’s inhibitions, encouraging an exploration of more opinions, more options and more 
experiences, enhancing one’s sense of self and others, and improving one’s overall appreciation of 
liberty. However, it is important to note that under certain conditions privacy can and ought to be 
removed. For example, should an act, committed under privacy, contravene the conditions of the harm 
principle, making the act morally impermissible, then the primary identity, or data, of the perpetrator 
ought to be revealed. Hence, an important aspect of my consequentialist argument is that privacy 
functions as a subordinate rule to the harm principle. 
 
While privacy may support prolific identity, voluntary affiliation benefits from the feature of 
unrestricted access. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Having shown that privacy primarily shields us from undue scrutiny or reprisal, and also works to 
promote the pursuit of our mutual interests, nevertheless, I have firmly established that it fulfils the role 
of a subordinate rule to that of the harm principle. And so, while privacy functions to conceal our 
primary identities with the intended or foreseen consequences of promoting important features of our 
liberty, should we in any way violate the harm principle, such a violation automatically precipitates the 
removal of our privacy. I now proceed to a discussion of the feature of unrestricted access. 
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5.3. UNRESTRICTED ACCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
This section includes the following: 
• A re-articulation of the importance of the feature of diversity in liberty; 
• A description of unrestricted access as it pertains to freedom of movement and association 
online; 
• A discussion as to why freedom of movement and association is important in accessing 
diversity but also in avoiding harm; 
• An explanation of the place and role of privacy within my rule-consequentialist approach. 
 
ON UNRESTRICTED ACCESS 
I like to think of an impression, most prescient in Mill’s version of liberty, of an ecosystem sustained 
through a balance of complex interactions-and-connections where diversity thrives. Interestingly, 
Luciano Floridi coined the neologism, infosphere, “on the basis of ‘biosphere’, a term referring to that 
limited region on our planet that supports life.” (Floridi, 2013: p.6) To my mind, diversity flows from 
interactivity. Online, people produce an environment of connectedness; the pathways created ought to 
be kept open; the principle ought to be one of unrestricted access. Here, ‘access’ refers to freedom of 
movement and association. Censure of any kind – limitations on movement, impediments to 
associations – imply restrictions contrary to liberty. 
 
Unrestricted access allows people to experience diversity. Diversity is comprised of multiple opinions. 
Opinions are formed from access to information with which people shape their interests. On Mill’s 
version of liberty, one ought to be free to select what is in one’s best interest. Doing so one ought to 
recognise the same in others, either acceding then to alternative perspectives which present better 
options, or refuting these in favour of fortifying one’s own opinions. From a libertarian perspective, 
one ought to be able to conduct one’s liberty with minimal external interference. This is consistent with 
a feature of freedom of movement and association. Of course, where informational availability is 
unwanted or potentially harmful, access to this information ought to be avoided, but not necessarily 
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restricted. In adults, this may be regulated through acts of self-determination, people voluntarily 
avoiding or exiting certain experiences or associations. Self-determination is a function of choice, and, 
similarly to actively affiliating, exiting or avoiding unwanted informational availability requires 
freedom of movement and (dis)association. This enables the avoidance of harm that may otherwise 
affect those who are unable to escape it. But to assume that standards of unwanted informational 
availability are the prerogative of external agents, such as governments or other social censors, is to 
assume that individuals ought not to have choice over their interests in the first place. Missteps of this 
nature, though, amount to a tyranny of opinion and prejudice. Of course, while shielding innocents, 
such as children, from improper relationships or inappropriate content online is, more than merely 
permissible, absolutely necessary, this is not the same as restricting adults’ access, where doing so limits 
their ability to properly express their liberty. In fact, on a rule-consequentialist view, shielding innocents 
and promoting proper access are compatible and morally permissible if the intended and foreseen 
consequences are to, a) avoid harm; and, b) maximise liberty. 
 
In the final analysis, maximising liberty requires unrestricted access to all types of information. 
Information which can be proved to be prejudicially false fortifies the position of alternative truth-
verifiable claims. Furthermore, if this prejudicial position constitutes popular opinion, then applying 
limitations on access to alternatives is, on a rule-consequentialist perspective, tantamount to pursuing 
foreseeable consequences which are morally indefensible. While it is unlikely that lines of such clarity 
on opinion may be drawn, the net gain of unrestricted access to diversity online is likely to further the 
project of liberty. 
   
As with the feature of privacy, unrestricted access functions as a subordinate rule to the harm principle. 
I shall go further to say that it is also subordinate to the rule of privacy. In the final analysis, restricting 
our access is less harmful than undermining our privacy. While the former may reduce our prospects of 
encountering a proliferation of opinions and affiliating freely, the latter can lead directly to undue 
scrutiny, or worse yet, undue harm. Therefore, the rules are in descending order of priority: harm 
principle – privacy – unrestricted access, which is consistent with the order of liberty – individual – 
collective. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having demonstrated that unrestricted access is an essential feature of liberty online, especially if we 
are to benefit from the widest array of opinions and affiliations, I have nevertheless established it as a 
subordinate rule to both that of the harm principle and the rule of privacy. In so doing, I have completed 
my set of consequentialist rules. These are, in combination, intended to regulate our online activities by 
applying minimal limitations on our liberty, thereby maximising its expression.  
 
I now turn to an explanation of what it means to maximise liberty and the internet, and, in so doing, 
summarise what a maximal version of liberty online ought to entail.  
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6. LIBERTY AND THE INTERNET 
6.1. MAXIMISING LIBERTY 
Think of liberty taken to the Nth degree – an outer limit. A practical limit nevertheless, not a region of 
unattainability: the Nth degree of what each of us may hope for.  
 
We would hope to express everything we were capable of expressing, affiliate as readily as we wanted, 
encounter as much as we were capable of experiencing, and benefit from the broadest range of interests 
available to us. Under these conditions, one’s autonomy and purpose is provided scope to reach a 
maximising limit. 
 
Where liberty extends beyond what may have been previously possible, is with the conception of 
prolific identity online. We have come to appreciate that online we can express ourselves through 
multiple self-conceptions, simultaneously in parallel. This expands our scope of affiliation. It also 
amplifies the other features of liberty. 
  
On a consequentialist view, the Nth degree of liberty seeks to bring about the best consequences in 
terms of expressing our autonomy, purpose, freedom of expression and affiliation, as well as our prolific 
identities. However, this is dependent upon the following rule-consequentialist formulations: 
• Liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, by 
extension, collective purpose, where all affiliates abide by the harm principle. 
• Autonomy is exemplified when our personal and moral considerations are made to apply to our 
self- and other-regarding interests. 
• Purpose is exemplified when we adapt and align our positive and negative liberties 
proportionally. 
• Our prolific identities can be maximised online under conditions of privacy. 
• Freedom of (expression and) affiliation thrives online under conditions of unrestricted access. 
 
 LIBERTY AND THE INFOSPHERE: AFFILIATION OVER CITIZENSHIP – Craig Bregman (9405381W) – Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals – November 2017 
51 
From the above formulations we can deduce what acts are likely to obstruct the best consequences and 
are therefore morally impermissible. These include: 
• Acts intended to elicit the non-consenting coercion of unwilling participants, or acts intended 
to inflict direct harm on innocents. 
• Acts where our autonomy is exercised without regard to our personal and moral considerations. 
• Acts where our purpose is rendered so as to break the alignment of our positive and negative 
liberties. 
• Acts which compromise our privacy and, in so doing, reduce our ability to maximise our 
prolific identities. 
• Acts which restrict our ability to freely express ourselves and affiliate. 
 
6.2. MAXIMISING THE INTERNET 
Consider the internet taken to the Xth degree: identities and affiliations proliferating exponentially. 
Again, not impractically. Socially, for example, people can interact with 10’s, 100’s, 1000’s, or 
100,000’s of people via networks and platforms projecting them across cyberspace. 
 
Online, I may express a range of interests and personas. In certain instances, these may reflect my 
offline equivalents, for example, as a fan of a local sports team. But, in other instances, they may extend 
beyond my offline equivalents. For example, I may express political interests unavailable to me in my 
lived experience. I may affiliate in the same way too, keeping close to my offline collectives or seeking 
affiliations outside of them. Given the internet’s informational synchronicity, whatever I express 
remotely (online) is immediately happening locally (offline) too – while I am online in multiple 
locations I am also offline interacting from home. In other words, from a fixed, primary location, I am 
projecting across space and time – here in South Africa physically while communicating intangibly 
with people in Asia and Europe and also travelling elsewhere via virtual reality simultaneously. 
Nonetheless, I am psychologically and narratively always me. Any supposed distance between my 
activities online and offline is collapsible. The implications of this hyper-connectivity are significant. 
For example, under whose jurisdiction am I acting when I enter a foreign online location? If I should 
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form a same-sex relationship with someone from a country outlawing this, are we protected under some 
sort of international immunity? Running counter to this, my activity online is also asynchronous. My 
records – interactive, intimate, personal – may be accessible long after an event, circulating beyond my 
control. In other words, I may be subject to scrutiny by others without context. For example, should I 
relocate from one place to another, or apply for a job, could the history of my online activities come 
back to unfairly haunt me? Here I am thinking of permissible interests and affiliations, not public 
records of misconduct. Hence, while the internet is an environment whose scope for freedom of 
expression and association extends beyond that available offline, the normative rules of privacy and 
unrestricted access ought to work to maximise, but importantly also safeguard liberty. 
 
Like liberty, the internet taken to the Xth degree is not without practical limitations. As I have contended 
throughout this report, these limitations ought to be kept to a minimum, but that minimum must satisfy 
the basic criteria of withstanding exploitation. They must be permissive yet prudent. Privacy ought to 
protect me in all manner of my expression from undue harm. And unrestricted access ought to enable 
me to affiliate freely. 
 
 
6.3. COMBINING AND MAXIMISING LIBERTY AND THE INTERNET 
Taking the Nth degree of liberty and applying it online, how can a maximising combination of liberty 
and the internet be realised? Firstly, by acknowledging the distinguishing features and conditions of 
liberty and the internet respectively. Secondly, by applying a prudential set of normative constraints 
with the intention only of safeguarding the interests of liberty. That is, the constraints are minimal and 
not maximal, drawing on a libertarian sense of individual freedom enabled under the permissiveness of 
a minimal state. Furthermore, the intention of securing a maximised version of liberty online can, I 
contend, be achieved by adopting a consequentialist approach of pursuing the most favourable foreseen 
results based on rules respecting the equality of all agents’ interests. 
 
In summary then, the conditions of liberty include: 
• Liberty is primarily a matter of individual interest. 
• Individual liberty is constituted initially from a comprehensive version of autonomy. 
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• Autonomy enables individual purpose of a positive kind relating to one’s will and/or ability to 
act. 
• Purpose is maximised then under circumstances that do not impede one’s will and/or ability to 
act. 
• A collective is comprised of individuals, that is, collective liberty is derived from and an 
extension of individual liberty. 
 
Hence, liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, by 
extension, collective purpose. 
 
• Furthermore, individual interest is drawn, formed, and refined from interaction with others in 
an environment of diversity. 
• Diversity benefits from interactivity-and-connectedness among the widest range of interests. 
• Individuals ought to be free to access as many interests as they choose and from these express 
a version of their own interests. 
• Interactivity among individuals and within collectives ought not to be impeded. 
 
Hence, an environment able to accommodate the widest range of interests and facilitate the freest 
interaction among individuals and within collectives is preferable for the purpose of promoting a 
maximising version of liberty. 
 
• Nation-state conceptions of citizenship are in the first instance arbitrarily assigned to 
individuals at birth. 
• Nation-state conceptions of citizenship are limited by the laws and customs of governance in 
effect within each nation-state. 
• Nation-state citizenship cannot necessarily appeal to the interests of all its citizens, nor can it 
enable the free movement of its citizens or other citizens across national borders, nor can it 
guarantee the incorporation of other societal norms into its own ethical standards or vice versa. 
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• The internet though is an environment that can facilitate a much freer movement of agents and 
interests. 
 
Hence, the internet is conducive to promoting a maximising version of liberty. 
 
In lieu of the protections of individual interest within liberty, the internet ought to be regulated 
according to a normative approach which, a) enables liberty to be maximised; and b) ensures against 
harm that may be inflicted by the irresponsible or exploitative expression of liberty; and c) overcomes 
constraints such as of a nation-state conception of citizenship. 
 
I have therefore proposed a rule-consequentialism based on the following: 
• The equal recognition of each person’s claim to express their liberty. 
• The foreseen consequences capable of producing morally permissive actions based on the 
intended benefits for all involved. 
 
Applying this approach so as to maximise liberty online, and in keeping with the tenets of liberty, the 
rules are, in descending order of priority as follows: 
• The harm principle: ensuring against direct harm inflicted on non-consenting innocents. 
• Online privacy: preserving the integrity of individuals’ identity such that they are not exposed 
to undue scrutiny which may then lead to them suffering acts of direct harm. 
• Unrestricted access: enabling free interaction among individuals and within collectives such 
that their liberty can thrive. 
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7. OBJECTIONS 
Throughout my report I have already plotted and rebutted several objections. In this section, I present 
a few more for consideration, relating them to specific sub-sections of my report. 
 
IDENTITY 
Prolific identity may be theoretically possible, but can it be practically realised? And, if it can, does it  
not run the risk of undermining the virtue of responsibility by allowing agents to separate personas in 
such a way as to absolve each persona from having to take responsibility for the actions of any of the 
other personas? 
 
Prolific identity is a poly-narrative composite comprised of multiple interests. One may not always be 
able to express these interests in one’s lived reality. For example, one cannot present as two genders 
simultaneously. Or, one may be too afraid to openly express political views which may expose one to 
harm. Or, quite simply, one may not have access to a set of beliefs one is nonetheless strongly drawn 
to and would like to explore further. And, finally, one may not practically be able to communicate with 
100’s or 1000’s of friends at a time. Nonetheless, one may feel strongly about various opinions, 
aspirations, and feelings towards as expansive or narrow a range of interests and relationships one would 
like to have. In their chapter, Online and offline relationships, in the book entitled, ”How the World 
Changed Social Media”, the authors reject “a dualism of offline against online” and begin with a 
definition of social media as scalable sociality.” (Miller, Costa, Haynes, McDonald, Nicolescu, Sinanan, 
Spyer, Venkatraman and Wang, 2016: p.113) They demonstrate that in certain instances people find a 
greater intimacy online in relationships with strangers or peers who they do not live with (Ibid, p.113) 
and that “people recognise that they can exploit a variety of contexts for relationships as different 
frames.” (ibid, p.113) “Finally it is possible that this new dimension of visible creativity in both 
relationships and identity is making us more conscious, both of our relationships and of ourselves.” 
(Ibid, p.113) Hence, prolific identity, either expansively or narrowly, is feasible and realisable and 
especially so online. 
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How though ought one to take responsibility for having and expressing and acting upon all these 
potential interests? 
 
Suppose, for instance, that I have two online personas through whom I express conflicting opinions. 
Or, despite the pleasantness of all my other personas, I have one particular persona through whom I 
express highly inflammatory opinions with the intent of inciting others. Am I hiding behind my 
personas? Am I really able to claim that I was not aware of what they were doing? Oftentimes, people 
express conflicting opinions about a range of issues. And, people may have a nasty side to them, a 
particular perspective which reveals a character trait that seems out of keeping with the rest of their 
demeanour. So, there is nothing unrealistic about these scenarios. The question has more to do with 
how an individual ought to assume responsibility for his or her behaviour. If one persona should violate 
the harm principle, can the others be guilty of the same offence? And if two personas belonging to the 
same primary agent express diametrically opposed opinions, how does the primary agent apportion 
responsibility for the position of each? 
 
I have proposed a rule-consequentialist approach of regulating activity online. It applies rules in 
descending order of priority: harm principle to privacy to unrestricted access such that a violation of 
the harm principle automatically precipitates the removal of privacy and the implementation of 
restrictions. So, if one persona is guilty of violating the harm principle, the primary agent will bear the 
consequences across all personas. This type of comprehensive responsibility is consistent with the 
application of a psychological and narrative construct of identity. An individual is psychologically and 
narratively coterminous with all the interests of her life. She ought to assume responsibility for all her 
personas and interests, and all the activities related to them. In the first instance, the notion that one may 
absolve oneself of any responsibility for the actions or opinions of her personas is, therefore, incoherent. 
And in the second instance, as primary agent, she ought to take responsibility for her opinions and 
actions on the grounds of having good reasons for expressing them. In the final analysis, to borrow 
some legal terminology, each of us is jointly and severally liable for our various personas, interests, and 
opinions. This is the same as taking responsibility for all our actions offline too. 
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VOLUNTARY AFFILIATION 
“[Some]of the criticisms of [John Rawls’] veil of ignorance have argued, anonymity may simply offer 
the opportunity for rationalization of ongoing, thinly disguised agendas of self-interest, conscious or 
not, rather than a forum for impartial deliberation.” (Wallace, 1999: p.32) Wallace’s observation is 
drawn from her discussion of anonymity, but I refer to it here as a valid criticism of my feature of 
voluntary affiliation. 
  
The potential certainly exists that voluntary affiliation may encourage collective-forming initiatives 
attracted to insular interests. Simone Chambers points out in her chapter, Critical Theory, in the book 
entitled, “Alternative Conceptions of Civil society”, that “citizens can retreat into insular and defensive 
groups… where particularism and difference define participation and where the self-organization of 
citizens contributes to a general atmosphere of distrust and misunderstanding.” (Chambers and 
Kymlicka, 2002: p.101) Furthermore, once formed, these collectives may function to isolate their 
members from exposure to other ideas, thereby fortifying any prejudices they may already have. 
However, such a claim will, at the outset, have to defend the view that people are by their very nature 
averse to diversity. Rather than a claim of moral pluralism, this amounts to a claim of moral relativism, 
arguing that the very notion of moral progress ought to be viewed with scepticism. However, it is 
possible that insularity may come to define certain communities. But is insularity in and of itself 
impermissible? Recalling what I wrote about harm in the section On Liberty: “The harm principle, 
negatively speaking, prohibits actions based on their impermissible consequences, defined as those acts 
which may foreseeably result in either diminishing someone’s life prospects or causing them unwanted 
harm. On my view, the feature of foreseeability is important because it imputes responsibility to the 
agent of action based on knowledge of what may diminish another’s life prospects and/or cause them 
direct harm.” Insularity itself cannot necessarily cause harm. However, it may be argued that insularity 
is likely to curtail one’s life prospects. This type of insularity is then a form of involuntary affiliation. 
As Chambers notes, “Individuals do not develop life plans in isolation. They develop them in interaction 
with others in society. The freer that interaction is from the distorting effects of power and domination, 
the more opportunity actors have to exercise individual autonomy.” (Ibid, 2002: p.93) The underlying 
principle of voluntary affiliation is one of freedom to enter and/or exit at will. If one chooses to stay 
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within the confines of insularity, then one has made a choice to narrow one’s prospects in accordance 
with one’s interests. 
 
PRIVACY 
“Anonymity is one method of minimizing accountability. The Ring of Gyges scenario is when 
someone’s ability to be invisible – anonymous – allows unethical or criminal action with impunity.” 
(Wallace, 1999: p.31) Drawing anonymity into the feature of privacy, it is certainly possible that in 
some instances privacy may be exploited for bad ends. However, I have shown how privacy, while 
functioning to conceal our primary identities, nonetheless does not dissolve our identity – we are 
coordinatable, and traceable in the event of violating the harm principle. Therefore, practically as well 
as ethically we ought to assume responsibility for all our online activities. 
  
Furthermore, The Ring of Gyges scenario could only materialise if all the members, or affiliates, of a 
collective agreed to unilaterally violate the harm principle. Furthermore, this would entail the broader 
non-consenting acquiescence of any and all victims of the perpetrated offence, such that the net effect 
would be to entirely conceal the violation from detection. This not only violates the harm principle on 
two accounts (direct harm and non-consensual participation) but also violates the feature of voluntary 
affiliation which is intended to enable us to enter and exit collectives at will. The implication here is 
that neither unwilling participants nor non-consenting victims would be able to leave the collective and 
expose the violations taking place. Given that my argument appeals to a comprehensive sense of liberty 
derived from both our self- and other-regarding considerations, the chances of such a mass violation 
are remote. And in the final analysis, my rule-consequentialist argument stipulates unequivocally that 
if we should in any way violate the harm principle, then our veil of privacy ought to be automatically 
removed so as to expose and prevent further violations from occurring. 
 
CITIZENSHIP 
It may be argued that conditions of liberty are inextricably tied to conditions of citizenship. The only 
viable means of securing liberty is to secure the human rights of citizens. Furthermore, nation-states’ 
control of legal jurisdiction extends to policies governing citizens’ use of the internet. Ultimately, the 
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internet is subject, like citizens, to the limitations imposed by the nation-state. Therefore, to contemplate 
a situation in which citizenship is negated is, in many important respects, self-defeating. The better 
argument is to call for more widespread adoption of respect for and implementation of safeguards to 
secure human rights to liberty, online as well as offline. This is a compelling and important argument, 
articulated clearly in the following excerpt: 
 
“ARTICLE 19 [a non-profit organisation promoting freedom of expression] 
welcomes the adoption at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) of a significant 
resolution on “the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet” (A/HRC/32/L.20).” 
  
“The resolution is a much-needed response to increased pressure on freedom of 
expression online in all parts of the world”, said Thomas Hughes, Executive 
Director of ARTICLE 19. “From impunity for the killings of bloggers to laws 
criminalising legitimate dissent on social media, basic human rights principles are 
being disregarded to impose greater controls over the information we see and share 
online,” he added.” 
(https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38429/en/unhrc:-significant-
resolution-reaffirming-human-rights-online-adopted) 
 
However, upon evaluation of the likely outcomes of preferring a rights-based argument for liberty, 
focused on the participation of nation-states in lieu of their citizens, over the rule-consequentialism of 
regulating voluntary affiliation, I contend that the latter is practically more robust. My contention may 
be subject to criticism in the event of a unilateral, universal adoption of the human right to liberty 
extending to accommodate every conceivable interest, belief and practice. But this is hardly a realistic 
position. Furthermore, in the other extreme, if every nation-state were to crack down on human liberty, 
limiting it to a very narrow list of parochial permissions, then the former argument of securing the 
human right to liberty fails outright. So the better way of assessing the situation will be to view it from 
the contrasting perspectives of a fairly open environment and a fairly closed environment, each allowing 
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access to the internet perhaps in varying degrees. In both instances, given the order of rules I have 
applied in my rule-consequentialist approach, the protection from harm is of paramount importance. 
Privacy ought then to apply such that online, people’s primary identities are not subject to undue 
scrutiny. If access is then restricted, this is of a lower priority. While restricted access limits the potential 
of maximising liberty, it does not necessarily precipitate a violation of one’s privacy or freedom from 
harm. Therefore, defining the normative rules according to which voluntary affiliation can be exercised 
is, to my mind, a better way of securing a common denomination with which individuals can pursue 
their own styles of liberty. Furthermore, as much as this is a report involving technology, it is not 
principally about technology. Instead, it is about the ways in which liberty ought to be maximised 
through technology. And, because of the internet’s virtual borderless-ness, I am here reminded of the 
libertarian notion of self-ownership within a minimal state. Added to which, a libertarian perspective is 
less concerned about nation-state borders and objectives than it is about the position of individual 
freedom. Therefore, ultimately, to rely more heavily upon a theory of citizenship, which binds people 
arbitrarily yet inextricably to their nation-state, strikes me as counter-intuitive when it comes to 
expressing and maximising liberty in an environment such as the internet, which, even if limited in 
certain jurisdictions, enables virtual interaction beyond the nation-state. Morally speaking, I contend 
that it is better to rely upon a strong normative approach which prescribes impartial measures of equal 
consideration to all irrespective of citizenship or any other arbitrarily defining feature (or limitation) of 
their existence. 
 
UNRESTRICTED ACCESS 
Unrestricted access online could put minors, or other innocents, at risk of being exposed to inappropriate 
content. In other words, an unregulated space is potentially dangerous for those not equipped to navigate 
it. The same may be said for other sources of content such as bookstores and television. The notion 
though that minors, or other innocents, are susceptible to being taken advantage of to a greater extent 
online that in other environments is a serious criticism. However, the harm principle places a 
responsibility on those who are custodians of minors, or other innocents, to ensure their safety by 
shielding them from inappropriate activities that could have the effect of subjecting them to undue harm. 
The descending order of priority of rules specifically provides for instances of restricting access where 
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to do so would maintain the primacy of the harm principle. Therefore, it is incumbent upon adults to 
protect children in this way by limiting their online access accordingly. 
 
Furthermore, the harm principle obligates us to consider the interests of others so as to ensure that we 
do not participate in their non-consenting coercion. Therefore, in the event that minors or innocents 
were to inadvertently enter upon affiliations that were inappropriate for them, other affiliates are, on a 
consequentialist view, required to direct them away from such activities thereby protecting them from 
the potential harm they might otherwise be unwillingly subjected to. While I concede that it may be 
unreasonably difficult for us to know exactly who is necessarily a minor or an innocent, nonetheless, 
on the rule-consequentialist perspective I have proposed, the intended or foreseen consequences of 
having unrestricted access online would not be to potentially entice or coerce minors or innocents into 
participating in activities against their will. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In Liberty and the Infosphere: Affiliation over Citizenship, I have sought to define a normative means 
of maximising liberty online. On the question of what liberty entails, I have provided a substantive 
version drawn from the seminal work of John Stuart Mill. The main features of Mill’s version exemplify 
– in the first instance – the individual claim to liberty possessed of an appreciation of one’s self-interest. 
It extends then to include like regard for the liberty of others requiring that self-regarding interests be 
measured with other-regarding concerns. I extended this to include a comprehensive version of 
autonomy and a description of purpose aimed at aligning one’s positive and negative liberty. I 
underscored the independence of deliberation required in such a version of liberty with an account of 
libertarianism. Primarily focused on self-ownership and a minimum of external interference, as of a 
minimal state, libertarianism is permissive in the sense required to enable maximum liberty. So as to 
regulate the proper expression of this style of liberty, I advocated a rule-consequentialism based on 
impartial, equal regard for all individuals, attuned as well to the intended or foreseen benefit of pursuing 
good outcomes. The primary rule in this approach is Mill’s harm principle, applied negatively in that 
harm is not intrinsic to an opinion, practice or belief, but can only result from the intention of inflicting 
harm. This version of harm extends the range of permissible interests and activities beyond what may 
otherwise be deemed impermissible on the basis of opinion alone, which, in the worst cases amounts to 
social prejudice. The effect of all this is to claim that liberty ought to be maximised, on terms of 
amplifying its salient features, under conditions of minimal interference and with a minimum of rules 
directed towards good outcomes based upon impartial, equal treatment of all individuals; that by this 
version, liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, by 
extension, collective purpose. 
 
I then proceeded to create a bridge between this version of liberty and a core feature of individuality, 
being identity. I presented two conceptions of identity, namely, primary identity and prolific identity. I 
distinguished between the two, demonstrating that while primary identity included immutable details 
about an individual, prolific identity was directed towards the potential of expressing as wide a range 
of interests as possible. Prolific identity is thus the better version if one’s aim is to maximise liberty. 
More so, prolific identity by its very poly-composite nature is designed in a sense for a virtual 
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environment where intangibility and immutability are in operation. Hence, prolific identity points 
towards the environment of the internet as an ideal location for maximising liberty. I then explored two 
concepts of collective interest, namely, voluntary affiliation and citizenship. Extending the quest for a 
maximising version of liberty, I argue for why voluntary affiliation underscores the features of liberty 
by relying on one’s self-determination when it comes to voluntarily affiliating with others. By contrast 
I showed that one’s citizenship is at the outset arbitrarily located within a nation-state whose laws and 
customs may provide one with a sense of liberty but cannot guarantee it. Therefore, in the final analysis, 
both prolific identity and voluntary affiliation are regarded to be important aspects of maximising 
liberty online. 
 
A fundamental question in my argument is whether or not a distinction can be drawn between an online 
version of liberty and an offline version of liberty. Furthermore, is an online version of liberty a 
maximising version compared to an offline version of liberty? To compare and assess this I established 
the following four criteria: 
• The absence of impediments to individual and/or collective liberty. 
• The construction of prolific individual identity. 
• The enablement of voluntary collective affiliation. 
• The promotion of diversity of and access to multiple opinions. 
 
In each instance I demonstrated affirmatively that an online environment offers greater scope for 
pursuing, expressing and maximising liberty. And so, I then proceeded to examine not only the internet, 
but also the correct normative strategies and applied procedures for furthering liberty online. 
 
Drawing on the work of Luciano Floridi, I proceeded to describe the informational nature of the internet 
and also of human beings. I borrowed and inverted Floridi’s Levels of Abstraction (according to which 
our informational availability abstracts from a person eventually into basic elements) to posit Levels of 
Particularisation (LOPs). LOPs allow us to develop our online, informational personas in the expression 
of our prolific identities. The underlying objective here was to demonstrate that in an online 
environment one can express as wide or narrow a range of interests as one chooses. Similarly, one can 
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affiliate as widely or as narrowly as one would like to. In other words, online, one is in a minimal state, 
so to speak, whose limits of expression and interaction are vastly more permissive than what one might 
be able to experience offline. Having established this, I turned my attention to the next two rules in my 
rule-consequentialist approach, namely, privacy and unrestricted access (freedom of online movement, 
association, and access to content). Privacy I noted is not the same as anonymity. Anonymity is the 
complete absence of coordinatable traits that in combination can lead to one’s identification. Anonymity 
can be dangerous online, enabling people to void themselves of any responsibility for their actions. 
Privacy though ought to endure so as to protect individuals from undue scrutiny or harm. And privacy 
may only be removed in instances where someone has inflicted directed harm on an innocent thereby 
precipitating his or her, the perpetrator’s, identification. Privacy then extends an individual’s 
appreciation of liberty. Individually and collectively, unrestricted access allows for free movement and 
association online. By having access to as wide an array of experiences as one would like to have 
expands one’s scope, appreciation and expression of liberty. 
 
Importantly, I explained how my rule-consequentialist approach applies the rules of the harm principle, 
privacy, and unrestricted access in descending order of priority. So, if access is restricted this does not 
automatically precipitate the removal of privacy. And should one’s privacy be exposed, then the final 
rule of the harm principle ought still to be maintained. However, should the harm principle be violated, 
this automatically precipitates the removal of privacy and implementation of appropriate restrictions on 
access. 
 
I summed up my claims in the next section in which I combined maximising versions of liberty and the 
internet. In this section I sought to substantiate my central arguments. In brief these are that: 
• Liberty, in the form of autonomy, is exemplified through the expression of individual and, by 
extension, collective purpose. 
• The internet is ideally suited to promoting a maximising version of liberty. 
• A rule-consequentialist approach ought to be adopted so as to prevent direct harm to innocents 
and safeguard the identities and unrestricted interactions among individuals online. 
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In the final analysis, drawing on the words of Simone Chambers, “A world in in which there are many 
options, many contrasts to one’s chosen way of life, many moral differences, many conflicting identities 
to choose from, and many different associations to join is a world that has a built-in critical component.” 
(Chambers and Kymlicka, 2002: p.100) To that I would add that it is a world that also has a built-in 
appreciation of liberty. 
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